Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Hu Jiwei: Hu Yaobang and the Democracy Wall

Danwei's Andrew Chubb translated a 2004 article by Hu Jiwei, former chief editor of People's Daily, recalling Hu Yaobang and the Democracy Wall movement. The original Chinese could be read here.

Hu Yaobang and the Xidan Democracy Wall
by Hu Jiwei / Chenming, 2004.4

April 15 this year will be the fifteenth anniversary of Comrade Hu Yaobang's death. For the tenth anniversary in 1999 I wrote a piece called 'Hu Yaobang and the People's Daily'. This year the image of Yaobang has constantly flashed through my mind, leading me to once again reflect deeply. I can say from the bottom of my heart that among the high-level Party leaders I came into contact with, few were as broad-minded, tolerant, receptive, and willing to act on behalf of the people and take responsibility for the consequences, as Hu Yaobang. We might say he was the most democratically-spirited top-level leader in the history of the CCP, the one who, more than any other, took the point of view of the people.

I have already written much about what I know of his deeds, mainly from when he began leading the rehabilitation of victims of false charges and unjustly or incorrectly handled cases. However, I have not brought up what he did before that, including during the time of the Xidan Democracy Wall. In accordance with the situation concerning Hu Yaobang since his death, there has not been much description of these matters. Hence, in this commemorative article, I will recount his circumstances and thinking during the Xidan Democracy Wall period in order to fill the historical gap.

To summarise Hu Yaobang's conduct and actions during this time, he showed a close concern and enthusiastic support for the Xidan Democracy Wall, and made every effort to guide the movement.

The origins of Xidan Democracy Wall

I should first explain the Xidan Democracy Wall's birth and the national circumstances it was situated in.

On February 15, 1979, during a theoretical work conference called by the central government, People's Daily commentary department head Fan Rongkang and policy research office head Yu Huanchun issued a joint statement. The title was 'A Dissection of Xidan Democracy Wall'. I used this statement to summarise the Xidan Democracy Wall situation to the Standing Committee of the 1979 National People's Congress (NPC).

The Xidan Wall was located beside on the sidewalk on the north side of the road running east from Beijing's Xidan intersection. Buses serving several routes stopped here, and behind the bus stops was a low, gray wall approximately 200 metres long. As the volume of people passing through was high, there would often be missing persons notices and small advertisements stuck to this stretch of wall to attract people's attention. From the Spring Festival of 1978 people began hanging big-character posters here; many people read these posters, and as news of them spread it gradually became a place of bigger and bigger spontaneous gatherings.

To trace the origins of this – the expression of political views in big and small characters posted freely on a Beijing street – we need to return to the 'Tiananmen Incident' of the 1976 Qingming Festival. The criminal behaviour of the 'Gang of Four' had long been the subject of widespread indignation, and, availing themselves of the opportunity to commemorate Premier Zhou Enlai, people poured into Tiananmen Square to deposit wreaths and condolences on the Monument to the People's Heroes. More and more people began sticking up political poems opposing the Gang of Four, thus forming the 'Tiananmen Democracy Movement' of 1976, a strong popular force that helped end the Gang's dictatorship. The 1977 Qingming Festival also saw many poems around the Monument commemorating Premier Zhou and celebrating the smashing of the Gang of Four. During the 1978 Qingming Festival, the number of political poems around Tiananmen Square increased. On April 4, 1978 a big-character poster signed by 'Huo Hua and Yin Ming' suggested the hanging of political posters should be normalised and no longer limited to Qingming. The article said: "We should make this place a continuous forum, a meeting place the curtain never falls on, a position not to be surrendered, where at any time we may express our political opinions, publish our writings and let '100 Flowers Bloom and 100 Schools of Thought Contend'."

The article continued: "Here, every person may be a politician, thinker, scientist, artist, theorist and author, and at the same time be a reader, listener, viewer and critic. Here, every person is a master of society."

At the time, people saw this as a formal proposal for a 'Democracy Wall'. Of course, Tiananmen Square was not the right place to be regularly hanging posters, so people looked for a more suitable venue.

Then something happened that led even more directly to the appearance of Xidan Democracy Wall. The China Youth Daily newspaper and the magazine China Youth reappeared. Both were widely popular when the Cultural Revolution began in 1966 but had been forced to cease publication. China Youth returned in September 1978, and next month the China Youth Daily followed. No-one anticipated that the first issue of China Youth would provoke the man in charge of propaganda, Party Vice-Chairman Wang Dongxing, to prohibit its sale and order the recall of copies already distributed. This caused widespread anger among its young readers. No-one knows who it was, but someone pasted the banned issue of China Youth, page by page, onto that stretch of wall in Xidan. This caused a sensation in Beijing, with thousands upon thousands of people flocking to the Xidan Wall. After reading the big- and small-character posters on the wall, many people expressed opposition to the ban on China Youth. Others demanded the purging of the poisonous remnants of dictatorship, called for democracy, and still more big-character posters demanded freedom of expression and publication. Articles posted on the Wall that December demanding political democratisation, such as those written by Ren Wanding, Wei Jingsheng and others, provoked much reaction. Some young people spontaneously formed non-official groups and produced people's publications. As more and more people came to read and hang posters, people named the place 'Xidan Democracy Wall'.

Why did Wang Dongxing ban the first issue of China Youth? There were four reasons. One was that it published poems from the 1976 April Fifth ('4-5') Tiananmen democracy movement, which Wang said was a "counterrevolutionary incident". The second was that it did not publish any poetry by Mao Zedong. The third was that it did not carry an inscription from Chairman Hua. The fourth was that it carried an article, attributed to 'This Magazine's Commentator' and titled 'Eliminate Superstition, Understand Science', which pointed out for the first time that eliminating "modern superstition" meant eliminating superstition about Mao Zedong. At that time such a suggestion could be said to be a heinous crime, and this was the principal reason why Wang Dongxing ordered the ban. The article was written by the Central Propaganda Department Assistant Chief Li Honglin, and had been reviewed by none other than the recently-promoted Central Organisation Department Chief, Hu Yaobang. The facts showed that this issue of China Youth was not wrong; rather, it was doing precisely what the people wanted.

The content of posters on Democracy Wall varied greatly, from the appeals of those who had suffered injustice, to criticism, proposals, news and information, exposure of evil-doers and scandals. In the latter stages it was mainly political commentary. Within this, the most discussed topics were democracy and law. The principal points were: (1) summarising historical experience to investigate socialist democracy; (2) advocating unofficial and democratic publishing; (3) demanding freedom of speech and abolishing the "crime of malicious attack"; (4) admiration and esteem for Western democracy; and (5) publicly evaluating Mao Zedong's merits and failings. This content took many forms – poetry and stories, conversations, open letters, and annotations expressing agreement or disagreement. Some were signed with real names, others with pen-names, others still were completely anonymous. There were posters that showed a definite level of theoretical and literary skill, and there were also sarcastic and abusive rants; some were self-critical, others self-congratulatory.

Springing into action alongside the Xidan Democracy Wall were the people's organisations and people's publications, and the activist characters who emerged at this time. They would post their self-printed publications on the Xidan Wall, or distribute them to the crowds who came and went in their hundreds, eventually leading to attention from the Public Security Bureau. Foreign journalists and students in Beijing also rushed to Xidan to gather information and conduct interviews or chat with young people, and the foreign news services broadcasted news about it. All of this was certain to put Xidan firmly in the minds of the Central Government and other relevant agencies.

What did the appearance of Xidan Democracy Wall illustrate?

To explain this, we once again need to return to 1976, starting with the end of the Gang of Four in October.

After the Cultural Revolution's 10 years of feudal fascist dictatorship ended with the smashing of its ruling group, our country entered a new era, the era of construction of a people's democratic system. Liberated from heavy oppression, the Chinese people came out to vigorously demand thorough democratic reform, to demand change to the despotic system of dictatorship that had been masquerading as socialism for over 20 years, in order to gradually reform the country into a truly democratic – people's democratic – advanced nation.

Pushing for this democratic reform were two main forces: one was a top-down force, the other bottom-up.

The former was that group of figures Mao Zedong had called "those persons in authority taking the capitalist road". In order to advance quickly into a "communist society", Mao established a Stalinist-style single-party dictatorship. He labelled people of different political views, as well as all the other forces he identified, as various kinds of "anti-Party, anti-socialist, anti-Mao Zedong Thought" forces – the "Three Antis". These people had all previously possessed a certain level of power – from Party elders, to key figures in politics and the military, down to all levels of cadre, along with other public personalities and intellectuals – but they were now listed as targets for dictatorship. Mao named State Chairman and Party Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Party General Secretary and Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping as the bosses of a "bourgeois counterrevolutionary headquarters", calling himself the highest commander in the "proletarian revolutionary headquarters" of a great rebel army, with Lin Biao as his assistant commander. Running amok in this way, Mao brought down everything, overturned everything, and created a long period of chaos under heaven. In the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, facing an almost impossible situation, Mao had no choice but to ask Zhou Enlai to clean up the mess. Through tireless effort, Zhou had elders including Deng Xiaoping, Ye Jianying and Hu Yaobang set free, along with another group of cadres of all ages, in order to carry out the comprehensive reorganisation needed to alleviate the country's perilous situation. It was this group of characters who would overthrow and bury the regime of dictatorship, and take the lead in the new era of democratic reform.

Long-serving China Youth League Secretary Hu Yaobang was both a core figure in the comprehensive reorganisation under the leadership of Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, and one of the hidden plotters in the later overthrow of the Gang of Four. After the smashing of the Gang, in March 1977 he took up the post of Central Party School Executive Assistant Principal. This was the first restoration of a national-level cadre to a central leadership position, before other elders like Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. He bravely shouldered the great mission of making youth organisations the Party's rearguard, stepping forward without hesitation to bring together a group of pioneers on the theoretical and news fronts (with the covert support of some Party elders) to fire the first shots in the great movement for democratic reform. In October 1977, following the initial victory represented by criticism of the Gang of Four's crimes and the ferreting out of the Gang's factional power bloc, Comrade Yaobang set off a movement to rehabilitate those wrongly purged, setting free untold numbers of cadres of all levels, including many elders, and skilfully organising their return to leadership positions. This quickly reinvigorated areas in which work had long been paralysed. Soon afterwards, in May 1978, Yaobang and others set off a large-scale discussion about criteria for judging truth. Thus, by organisational, ideological and political methods, the longstanding dictatorship was basically brought to a close, the path was cleared for the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee, and, under the leadership of a new Party centre held up by Deng Xiaoping and with Hu Yaobang as General Secretary and Zhao Ziyang, Xi Zhongxun, Wan Li, etc., as core members, a new phase of reform and opening unfolded in country and city, economics and politics.

This was the top-down force for democratic reform. What about the other force, the bottom-up force for democratic reform?

At first, the force was the many low-level cadres, young workers and college students who had been attacked and ruined during the Cultural Revolution. Among these, some had been wronged particularly dreadfully, suffering the effects of injustice for many years either with nowhere to turn for recourse, or meeting with ever-heavier attacks the more they tried to clear their name. To be frank, the political rehabilitations that Hu Yaobang initiated were mostly of old cadres and a minority of mid- and low-level cadres. Rehabilitating the greater number of mid- and low-level cadres, workers, peasants and college students was still beyond his power. They saw the central government's policy becoming more enlightened by the day, with large numbers of cadres being freed, and they eagerly demanded their own injustices be rectified. However, their tormentors were generally still in authority – thus, to be rehabilitated they needed their superiors' mistakes to be corrected, which was a highly difficult proposition. So this great mass of wronged families fixed their eyes on the central government, and for a time petitioners flocked to Beijing and every provincial capital to appeal their cases. Besides seeking out the Central Organisation Department, Central Discipline Inspection Commission and each of the central government's newspapers, some wrote their stories of injustice on big- and small-character posters, pasting them in populous places.

In the first few months the content of the vast majority of posters on the Xidan Wall was mostly grievances and appeals for justice – issues discussed on their own terms and rarely touching on politics. Many people came mainly to vent their own sense of injustice and seek opportunities for redress. As the official press criticised the 'Two Whatevers' and promoted the discussion on the criterion of truth, the content of posters at the Xidan Wall concentrated more and more on the topic of political democracy, drawing closer and closer to sensitive issues and eventually leading to numerous and complex discussions. The discussions focused on questions like: is Xidan Democracy Wall a healthy thing or is it reactionary? Is it a display of vitality in our nation's political life, or an element of instability? Should Democracy Wall be erased from our nation's political life, or should it receive increased guidance to make it develop more healthily? These all concerned the big questions of whether or not to have socialist democracy, and if so how to develop it, and also whether or not it was possible to maintain a stable and unified political situation while accelerating the achievement of the Four Modernisations.

Party leadership figures speak highly of Democracy Wall

At the time, opinions among the leadership figures varied, with Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying both having publicly praised Democracy Wall. At a meeting with a Japanese Socialist Party committee head on November 26, 1978 Deng said: "Writing big-character posters is permitted by our country's constitution. We have no right to deny or criticise the masses for carrying democracy forward by hanging these posters. If the masses are angry, let them release their anger. The masses' comments are not all deeply thought-out, but we cannot demand complete correctness, and this is nothing to be afraid of." Following this, in a speech during Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee in December, Deng reiterated, "The masses should be permitted to put forward opinions. Even if there are some harbouring grievances who want to use democracy to stir up trouble, that is still nothing to be afraid of – we should deal with it appropriately in the belief that the great majority of the masses can judge right from wrong." Deng also warned: "A revolutionary party is one that is afraid of not hearing different voices – it is silence that is most to be feared."

Ye Jianying, in his speech to the Third Plenum on December 13, spoke highly of Democracy Wall. Commander Ye said: "The Third Plenum is a model of internal Party democracy; the Xidan Democracy Wall is a model of people's democracy." These two sentences from Commander Ye were extremely important, representing an evaluation of the forces for democratic reform. For if these two democratic forces, top-down and bottom-up, could be solidly combined, it would surely be a huge advance. The position of the forces of democracy would be greatly strengthened in their struggle with the forces of dictatorship.

Unfortunately, Hu Qiaomu deleted these two sentences from the official published records of the Third Plenum.

It should be apparent that attitudes towards Xidan Democracy Wall were indeed many and varied. Some praised it, some derided it, some commented that it was great, others commented that it was terrible. When Deng Xiaoping made his comments he was very firm in his attitude, but after the meeting his bearing changed. As a great reader of people, Hu Qiaomu sensed this shift and used his power over document distribution to brazenly erase Commander Ye's crucial two sentences.

The big change in Deng's attitude came during the period of the Theoretical Work Conference, as two ideologies crossed swords in a fierce battle. By March 1979, after Ren Wanding and others had pasted up their Declaration of Chinese Human Rights, and especially after Wei Jingsheng posted Do We Want Democracy or a New Dictatorship? on March 25, Deng's attitude had clearly undergone a major change. On the fourth day after Wei hung his poster he ordered Wei's arrest. From this point on the conservative forces [within Deng’s reformist coalition] had the upper hand, and the fate of the Xidan Wall was extremely precarious.

Hu Yaobang: Democracy Wall is the heartfelt voice of the people

When the Democracy Wall first appeared the central leaders all followed it very closely. Chen Yun issued special instructions for the People's Daily to send a reporter deep into the midst of the crowd to relay the movement's dynamics and situation. The paper dispatched Internal Political Bureau editor Wang Yong'an to perform this task. I repeatedly warned him to do no more than try to learn the situation, understand its direction and ask for materials, and to absolutely avoid declaring his own opinions. Wang Yong'an wrote numerous 'internal' reports for the central leadership.

I sent many reports about the Xidan Wall to Yaobang, and attended a small meeting he chaired.

In short, Comrade Yaobang was greatly interested in the Xidan Democracy Wall, having already indicated his admiration for it, and believed its big-character posters to be different from those of the Cultural Revolution and before. He believed that in the past they had mostly been used by leaders to punish and harm people. This time, the big-character posters were like those of the May Fourth Movement, voices coming from people's hearts, a new people's awakening.

I related to Yaobang how people were rushing to Beijing to petition, how some were taking to the streets with their complaints, others writing big-character posters, and still more sitting outside government offices silently asking for their petitions to be heard. I told him how this had greatly shocked some leaders in power, who had called loudly for order to be restored at once. I said this was a positive effect of his political rehabilitation programme. Most of the severely wronged cadres and ordinary people had seen how the central government was now encouraging rehabilitations, and many were now rushing to county and provincial capitals, showing their trust in and dependence on the central government and their belief that, with the central government now doing what was right, there was hope that their problems could be solved.

Yaobang agreed. He said that the rehabilitations had only just begun, so all over the country much work had to be done on the incoming letters and petitions, and every effort made to solve local problems locally if possible, in order to avoid involving the central government. While Yaobang continuously enlarged the scope of the rehabilitations, he also sent instructions to Party, government and news organisations everywhere to work harder on incoming letters and petitions. At the same time, he was actively preparing to call a national complaints handling conference. At this conference he said firmly: "All untrue words, all incorrect conclusions or handling of cases, no matter when or under what circumstances they happened, no matter what level of organisation or person authorised them, must be corrected by seeking truth from facts." These instructions – Yaobang's 'Two No-matters' – practically eliminated the ball-and-chain of the 'Two Whatevers', bringing the rehabilitations down to the base level, to cadres and masses who been suffering the effects of their injustice for more than a decade.

Comrade Yaobang also saw the petitioners' hanging of big-character posters, the formation of people's organisations and the emergence of people's publications as greatly important, and directed all news organisations to be sure to reflect this situation in their reports. The People's Daily published a 'Special Compilation' for the central government that included a selection of Xidan Wall big-character posters and some longer small-character posters and articles from the people's publications. We also published an 'F.Y.I.' loose-leaf anthology for a small number of leaders. Other newspapers, periodicals and related work units in Beijing also specially published this type of internal reference material during this period.

For a period of time, the Guizhou people's organisation called the 'Enlightenment Society' was very active in Beijing. In order to understand the Enlightenment Society's circumstances, Yaobang got the People's Daily to send a reporter to investigate. The office sent commentator Comrade Zhou Xiuqiang to Guiyang. After Zhou returned from his investigation, Yaobang summoned him specially to his office to hear his findings.

Yaobang: We must halt the slide away from the masses

Besides getting newspapers to dispatch journalists to cover the Wall, Yaobang also brought together newspapers, the Central Propaganda Department, the Communist Youth League, unions and other work units to discuss how best to deal with people's organisations. The general spirit of this was was to discuss with us our experience of all the Party's previous work for the masses. He recounted several great mass movements – the December Ninth Movement, the Xi'an Incident, strikes, petitions, marches, demonstrations – saying our Party had always appreciated the importance of such events. It was the Party's special character to be deeply immersed among the masses, win the trust of the masses, and to rely on the masses in bringing forth its leadership function. This was our Party's fine tradition of working for the masses, he said. But, he recalled, after we had taken power, our Party's glorious tradition of working for the masses had gradually started to deteriorate. When the masses stood up, some of our leader-comrades became frightened. When they weren't bossily issuing orders from above they were standing opposite the masses allocating blame. They began to fear the masses more and more so that now, if the masses wanted to gather, march or petition, they had to get approval first. Our mass organisations, like the Communist Youth League and the unions, had also changed, drifting further and further from the masses. We had to correct this course of action, he said, which had seen us sliding away from the masses.

Just as political posters began to appear on the Xidan Wall, Yaobang wrote a warmly cordial open letter to a youth, which was published in the April 10, 1978 edition of the People's Daily as 'Letter from an old cadre to a youth'. The letter especially emphasised that youth workers "should often go to the youth to discover advanced [role] models and types, and use these advanced things to guide, educate and influence other youths. The way to educate the young is not pressure and it is not arrests, it is guidance. 'Guidance' is a better term than 'education', as its meaning is broader. This is the conclusion of decades of work experience. Suppression and slaps on the hand, these are the methods of feudal parents." These heartfelt words from a leader with decades of Youth League experience were a compass for dealing with youth and mass movements in the new era.

Yaobang: I respectfully suggest that comrades do not arrest people

After the arrest of Wei Jingsheng at the end of March 1979, Comrade Yaobang indicated his disagreement in a speech to the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress in June. Yaobang said: "I support anyone exercising their democratic rights under a socialist system. I hope everyone can enjoy the greatest freedom under the protection of the Constitution. Despite the numerous comrades criticising me by name or otherwise during the Central Work Conference and this People's Congress, saying I was going behind the central government's back, supporting a so-called democratisation movement that violated the Four Modernisations, and encouraging anarchy, despite all that I still maintain my views." Regarding Wei's arrest he said: "I respectfully suggest that comrades do not arrest people who engage in struggle, still less those who merely show concern. Those who are brave enough to raise these problems, I fear, will not be put off by being thrown in jail. Wei Jingsheng has been held for more than three months, and if he dies he will become a martyr of the masses, a martyr in the hearts of all."

That year, on November 14, the People's Daily printed an article by Guo Luoji called 'We can talk about political problems too', examining and elucidating the principles of "don't shoot the messenger" and "speech is not a crime". Some people believed these articles spoke on behalf of Wei Jingsheng, and they lined up to criticise the People's Daily. Hu Qiaomu was greatly incensed by it, complaining to Deng Xiaoping that the paper had flagrantly excused Wei of his crimes. This began a dispute between Hu Qiaomu and I. With no basis at all, he accused us of completely affirming the innocence of counterrevolutionary political opinions, and demanded to know why I had published this kind of important article without sending it to the central government for examination. In fact, the article had been reviewed and edited by Yaobang. Not wanting to pull him into this whirlpool of discord, I replied that the People's Daily had the right to publish this kind of article without running it past the censors. Afterwards I consulted Yaobang, who specially arranged several legal experts to come and talk it over. They said Guo's article was not particularly wrong, but that his thesis was not complete enough as it had not explained that freedom of speech was also restricted by the law. Forthwith they wrote an article for the People's Daily called 'Discussing the speech and behaviour problem within counterrevolutionary crimes', reaffirming "don't shoot the messenger" and explaining Article 102 of the Criminal Code, "the crime of counterrevolutionary incitement", and the principles behind it.

Only then was the big stick of Hu Qiaomu safely avoided. From this we could see how committed Comrade Yaobang was to upholding freedom of speech and opposing speech-crimes. Later, when many of us persistently advocated the abolition of "counterrevolutionary crimes", it was based on the same principle.

Hu Yaobang endorses the establishment of a Democracy Park

Resolutions were passed at the Second Session of the Fifth NPC in November 1979 on the question of banning the 'Xidan Wall', and at the Third Session in September 1980 on the question of abolishing the 'Four Big Freedoms' (the right to air views freely, to hold mass demonstrations, hang big-character posters and conduct great debates). These two resolutions strangled the Xidan Wall. I made statements to both sessions making clear my disagreement.

These two resolutions had already been decided by the central Party leadership so I could not openly oppose them. I could only objectively explain the Xidan Wall's origins and development and suggest a pragmatic approach.

While the Fifth NPC's Twelfth Standing Committee discussed banning the Xidan Wall in June 1979, in a group meeting I advocated replacing Democracy Wall with a Democracy Park. I did not agree with the idea of a 'ban' – I thought it would be better to increase supervision and nurture it instead. The opinions I presented on that occasion basically outlined Fan Rongkang and Yu Huanchun's joint statement at the Theoretical Work Conference earlier that year, describing the following two suggestions:

"In order to guide the Democracy Wall towards healthier development, we suggest turning the Beijing Working People's Cultural Palace into a Democracy Park with a special big-character poster area. Forums on democracy could be held in the Labour Theatre, with the masses allowed to freely participate and speak. In accordance with the masses' demands, heads of work units should be organised to meet with the masses and address the problems they bring up. That way the heads of Party and government departments could inform the masses of the relevant circumstances, difficulties and current plans so that they may have an understanding of the overall situation. If the masses have any objections they will be able to express them face-to-face, so naturally they will have no need to surround the premises of Party and government institutions." We took England's Hyde Park as an example in putting forward our vision. In the same NPC group meeting I said: "Britain's bourgeois government has the courage to allow Hyde Park; could it be that our country's proletarian people's government is not even equal to them? Do were really dare not have a Democracy Park? There are many ways of realising democracy, and a Democracy Park is one good way, allowing mass opinions to be heard and all their positive elements to be put into the service of socialism – what could be wrong with that?"

Afterwards I outlined our opinions to Yaobang, who agreed with the idea of setting up a Democracy Park. He asked me to talk to the Beijing government. After looking into it the Beijing Municipal Committee told me they felt that the Working People's Cultural Palace already served many functions and that to mess around with its original structure would create problems. But they agreed to let us choose a different park as a testing ground. Eventually Yuetan Park was chosen and a big-character poster area was established. However, with Wei Jingsheng having been arrested, and the tension increasing day by day, very few people hung posters there. And since Yuetan Park was not on a major transport routes, the numbers of people going there specifically to read posters were even smaller. The experiment died of natural causes.

Later I finally came to realise that while the idea of making the Working People's Cultural Palace into a Democracy Park was a good one, it was completely unrealistic. Only in a highly democratic environment can such a thing be established or sustained. Clearly our thinking was rather naïve.

Cancelling "Big Democracy" is not cancelling democracy

In September 1980, as the Third Session of the Fifth NPC discussed removing the clause about the 'Four Big Freedoms' from the Constitution, I made a statement to a meeting of the Sichuan Delegation titled Cancelling 'Big Democracy' is not Cancelling Democracy.

In the statement I said: "I completely endorse the deletion of Clause 45 of the Constitution, the cancellation of Big Democracy of the 'great contention of viewpoints/big demonstrations/big-character posters/great debates' kind. The reason is that ever since this topic was raised in 1957, this so-called 'Four Bigs' form of Big Democracy has in reality been a tool for a succession of political movements aimed at suppressing others. Over the past 20-something years what were originally contradictions among the people, including many differences of opinion and acquaintance, were raised to the higher plane of 'class and road struggle'. The methods of 'Big Democracy' were used by people to bring down those whose opinions were different from their own one after the other, and this was itself a fundamental violation of [Chairman Mao's] theory of how to correctly handle contradictions among the people. Through successive political movements, and especially through the so-called 'Cultural Revolution', everybody saw clearly that what we call the Four Bigs was in reality a way for figures in authority exploiting leadership and using distortion and exaggeration, framing and false accusations, arbitrary fabrication, the inversion of black and white, and never-ending escalation, to incite the masses (among them many naïve youths) to bring down those they wanted brought down. The framer and false accuser himself did not need to take any responsibility, since he was of the 'rebel' or 'revolutionary' faction, and 'mass movements' were 'naturally rational'. Those falsely accused had absolutely no right to defend themselves. If they tried, even more big-character posters would appear. For a 'stubborn attitude' or 'crazed counterattacks', out would come the 'unrepentant' cap. Thus, the Four Bigs kind of Big Democracy had nothing to do with real democracy. It was just a way to deceitfully use the name 'revolutionary mass movement' to implement barbaric and feudal fascist dictatorship."

In the same statement I also mentioned the misconceptions some members of society had towards the cancellation of the Four Bigs. I explained:

"There is currently some contention at home and abroad regarding the cancellation of the Four Bigs style of Big Democracy. Outside China it is understood according to translations. 'Great contention of views' and 'great demonstrations' are translated as 'free speech' and 'complete expression of one's views'. Foreigners find this difficult to understand – how can we cancel the people's right to speak? I believe that cancelling the Four Bigs does not equal cancelling freedom of speech. This point only needs to be explained properly for people to understand. As for those people with ulterior motives who are using our cancellation of the Four Bigs to slander and attack us, that is a different sort of problem. Within China it is mainly due to the existence of bureaucratist and patriarchal ways among all levels of leadership. Also, some of the masses are still angry and have objections to raise, so many of them still believe big-character posters are useful and shouldn't be completely cancelled. I believe this kind of opinion is reasonable. Thus, I suggest that if a poster is signed and taken responsibility for, presents the facts and talks reasonably, it should be allowed to be posted within the author's work unit. This is completely different to the Four Bigs, representing instead the right to free speech that the people should have and that no person can deprive them of. The rules of the Four Bigs and Big Democracy have been deleted from the Constitution but that absolutely does not mean that all hanging of big-character posters now violates the Constitution." My view was that only the indiscriminate hanging of big-character posters on the street should be prohibited, and that they should always be allowed in appropriate places within the grounds of government departments. Our newspaper should run more mass opinions, I said, and our publishing unit's internal publications had to run more letters, petitions and complaints in order to provide more opportunities for the masses to express their opinions.

I discussed these opinions with Yaobang and he agreed with all of them.

'Long Live the People': The grand blueprint for the democracy movement in Yaobang's heart

The initiator of the smashing of the Gang of Four, Commander Ye Jianying added the vital finishing touch to the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Standing Committee when he said: "The Third Plenum is a model of internal Party democracy; the Xidan Democracy Wall is a model of people's democracy." At that time Yaobang was working with the tide, trying to consolidate and develop the two forces for democracy, trying to bring them closer together, and gradually facilitating a new era of advanced democracy. A blueprint to develop this wave of democratic action had already started to take shape in Yaobang's heart. Yaobang's conception is best shown, I think, in a long exposition titled 'Long Live the People' that was run across three People's Daily issues beginning on December 21, 1978, and which Yaobang coordinated the writing of under the name 'Special Commentator'. The article originally came from a drafting group under the leadership of Ruan Ming and Lin Jianqing and was principally the latter's work. This planned, programmatic thesis made perfect use of the opportunity afforded by the political rehabilitations of Tiananmen Incident participants and the removal of Deng Xiaoping's 'Deng Nagy, Black Hand of the Tiananmen Counterrevolutionary Incident' label at the Central Work Conference held in the lead-up to the Third Plenum.

'Long Live the People' was the theme of the article, and it was dedicated to evaluating the 1976 April Fifth Tiananmen movement and summarising its historical experience, explaining how this great revolutionary mass movement, like the May Fourth and December Ninth movements, showed the eternal truth and power of the people.

The article said: "The 1976 revolutionary mass movement was not just a display of Party, military and popular will, it was also a display of the people's wisdom, talent, ingenuity and the art of struggle." It said: "Before the movement there was nobody appealing, mobilising and organising; there was nobody checking the target of struggle, nobody drawing up programmes of struggle and nobody readying the battle flag of struggle. The masses of people were both the brave fighters of this movement and outstanding organisers and conductors . . . demanding scientific socialism, people's democracy and the Four Modernisations was the programme for struggle that the masses themselves drew up during the movement, and it raised a most heartening and inspiring banner for achieving the Four Modernisations."

This article came out just as the Xidan Democracy Wall mass movement was flourishing, so when it sang the praises of the April Fifth Tiananmen mass movement it was essentially praising the Xidan Democracy Movement too. The article said: "All the masses who suffered the oppression and bullying of the Gang of Four have genuinely stood up as a result of a general awakening. They have not only positively put forward their political and economic demands, they have also tried pushing for the achievement of these social transformations via their own methods, means and measures, leaving their mark on the whole revolutionary development process. They understood that . . . to achieve the Four Modernisations we first had to amputate the Gang of Four, that malignant tumour on the organism of Party and government . . . and that only by achieving the Four Modernisations can poverty, backwardness and the remnants of dictatorship finally be escaped, and a great socialist country with a high degree of political democracy and a flourishing economy become reality."

The article continued: "The revolutionary movement at Tiananmen Square was the great act that decided the result of our Party's struggle with the Gang of Four. It laid the important mass foundation for the 'October Revolutionary Victory' [the Gang's arrest], and in this sense the Tiananmen Incident sounded the Gang's death knell."

The article's brilliance lay in setting out the basic attitude revolutionaries should take towards revolutionary mass movements. As far as we genuine, original mass-revolutionaries were concerned that had never been something abstract, yet unfortunately over the years many of us had forgotten it. The time chosen for the article's publication was just as the Xidan Democracy Wall was peaking and creating fear among some of those in power. This showed Hu Yaobang's thorough open-mindedness towards the new-era democratic movement.

Outlining the correct basic attitude towards mass movements, the article issued a sincere and earnest warning to all revolutionaries: "This kind of great political awakening and historical activity is the most important manifestation of our Party and government's efforts. Just as Lenin pointed out, 'A state's power lies in the awakening of its people. Only by taking the people to be all-knowing, all-determining and consciously all-doing can the state have power.'

"Every revolutionary and every Marxist should raise their hands to welcome and resolutely support the appearance of this type of spontaneous mass struggle that is forming itself into self-conscious revolutionary action."

Immediately afterwards, the article quoted Lenin as saying: "The working people are extremely sensitive, and are most adept at discerning who is an honest and sincere communist." The article then elaborated: "If there are some Party members and state cadres who forget our Party's flesh-and-blood connection with the people, forget that our Party relies on the power of the masses to remain in power, who do not use the power the masses have assigned to them to protect the the people's interest but instead pursue a life of luxury and big houses for themselves, scheming to deprive the people of their right to rule and even oppressing, attacking and persecuting the people and ruining the glorious reputation of the Party and socialism, then the people have the right to discard them. If these people experience a great mass movement like the Tiananmen Incident, and then still continue with their old ways, if they remain unwilling to grow a bit of honesty and sincerity on the back of the four words 'Long Live the People', then the result will not be pretty."

This article was written in December 1978, so of course there was no way people could have predicted the even greater mass democracy movement that would break out 10 years later at Tiananmen. Even the NPC's decision to shut down Xidan Democracy Wall just one year later was not easily foreseen. However the article had in fact highlighted this from the opposite angle, pointing out that when the masses rose up from below, the dragon would really have come to "those dragon-loving Dukes of Ye". Those who "don't go out and discover for themselves, who don't support and correctly guide the masses' self-conscious history-making operations, who are unwilling to keep up with the mass revolutionary ranks ahead, who gesticulated wildly and criticised minute details after the great struggle and victory of the masses – isn't this the furthest one can get from a Marxist attitude towards mass movements?"

The article sharply pointed out to the elderly lords of the Party: "There are some comrades who have made revolution for many years but who do not understand socialist democracy, who panic at the first sign of an upsurge of popular democratic spirit and always want to increase restrictions and suppression, who stand opposite rather than with the masses, thus completely departing from the basic principles of Marxism and our Party's fundamental standpoint. This is totally mistaken."

These passages seem to forecast how that clique of leftist forces would once again strike at and oppress the mass democratic movement. Unfortunately this warning did not attract the attention it should have, including from the new batch of leaders, among them Yaobang. Of course, it would not be true to say that Yaobang was not vigilant at all. Soon after the end of the Cultural Revolution, as people were savouring that triumph, Comrade Yaobang reminded the Chinese people to celebrate on the one hand the emergence of new forces for people's democracy but on the other to be more alert in order to avoid complications. As time has passed, the historic masterpiece that he oversaw the writing of more than twenty years ago has appeared increasingly brilliant.

Yaobang initiated the political rehabilitations when he had only just returned to the political stage.
While many old comrades were celebrating their liberation, he was weighed down with anxieties. Some comrades had raised a pointed issue: "Will another ambitious schemer like Lin Biao or Jiang Qing appear in our Party? Will they be able once again to usurp the Party and state's power of leadership?" Others from the media also raised the same type of problem with Yaobang: "Will the central Party newspapers again fall under the control of double-dealers, becoming once more tools in the usurping of the Party and state?" There were people who asked bluntly: "Will the Gang of Four stage a comeback?" I remember that at the time Yaobang answered clearly: "The Gang cannot come back, but it is possible they will be reincarnated in someone else's body."

This shows Yaobang's foresight. However, later facts showed that Yaobang also had significant limitations, for during the Theoretical Work Conference in early 1979 some particularly forward-thinking comrades raised the issue of Mao Zedong's criminal responsibility for the Cultural Revolution and whether we should be talking about a Gang of Four or a Gang of Five. Unfortunately people of this type were few in number; the majority of the Party elite had not arrived at that level of awakening. I myself also had not.

As far as I know, Hu Yaobang knew all about the shifting circumstances that surrounded the arrest of Wei Jingsheng and the banning of Democracy Wall. He was clear on Deng Xiaoping's 'Uphold the Four Cardinal Principals' and the gradual backsliding of the central Party's anti-leftist policy. He knew about Hu Qiaomu's deletion of the vital section of Commander Ye's speech to the Third Plenum – "the Third Plenum is a model of internal Party democracy; the Xidan Democracy Wall is a model of people's democracy" – from the official record. Afterwards Hu worked at developing and consolidating the two democratic forces and bringing them closer together towards the creation of a new democratic wave. Just think: if the spirit of the Third Plenum – the "model of internal Party democracy" – had been successfully implemented, and the "model of people's democracy", Xidan Democracy Wall, had been able to develop smoothly, if the two had really come together, what would our country's new democracy movement have become? It is worth pondering.

As it happened, Yaobang rallied [Zhao] Ziyang, Wan Li, Xi Zhongxun and other central leader-comrades to devote their all to implementing a guiding policy centred on economic construction. From abolishing the commune system in the countryside to breaking up the planned economy in the cities, they went against the tide, eliminating countless problems and, step by step, they corrected layer upon layer of errors from the era when Mao was in charge. It seems that as this great reform movement proceeded, spurring the rapid development of the entire national economy, Yaobang was increasingly powerless to halt the Party's retreat from the anti-leftist policy following the Four Cardinal Principles speech. After all, trying to fight a surging tide will only leave you at the bottom of the ocean.

More than twenty years on, remembering how Comrade Yaobang treated the popular democratic movement during the Xidan Democracy Wall period, I feel even more strongly that it should never be forgotten. It is worth reflecting on!


Thursday, January 27, 2011

Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi Criticizes Hong Kong

In a joint press conference held in Taiwan, Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi criticized the decision by Hong Kong government to deny their entry for Szeto Wah's funeral.

The event provided an extremely rare photo-op of these two famous 1989 student leaders together:



Wednesday, January 26, 2011

Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi Denied Entry to Hong Kong

As soon as they heard the news of Szeto Wah's death, Wang Dan and Wuer Kaixi, who are both at Taiwan right now, each expressed their wish to attend his funeral in Hong Kong. They regard Uncle Wah not only as a symbol of the oversea democracy movement but also a father-like figure in their respective personal lives. Wuer Kaixi, in particular, considers that he owe his life to Uncle Wah.

Being sensitive political figures themselves, however, they are not free to enter Hong Kong, a self-governing region within China. Their cases received great attention in Hong Kong legislature and media. Wang Dan publicly promised not to participate in any political activity or give any interview or speech if he is allowed to enter Hong Kong. Indeed, he proposed to arrive just for the service and leave immediately without even staying a night.

Yet their appeal was formally denied. In a statement, Wang Dan said he was not just disappointed. In fact, he felt anger and sorrow. He also expressed his worry that Hong Kong is gradually losing its own democracy and rule by law. Separately, Wuer Kaixi said that he was "deeply disappointed and saddened."

Saturday, January 15, 2011

People of 1989: Liu Huaqing


When General Liu Huaqing died in Beijing on January 14, he was praised, as part of the standard protocol as "an excellent party member, a faithful Communist fighter, outstanding proletarian, politician, soldier, and outstanding leader of the state and party" by the Chinese government. In addition, he was hailed as the "father of modern Chinese navy" by the international media.

Neither of them, however, made any mention of his role in the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, although the exact extent of which, like many other official government activities at the time, remain as state secret and unknown to the general public.

In 1989, Liu Huaqing was the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, serving under Deng Xiaoping, who retained the chairmanship in his semi-retirement. From that post, he was one of the three most prominent commanders of the army that first enforced (or at least tried to enforce) the martial law and then carried out the massacre. Indeed, many sources identified him as the command-in-chief of the martial law troops, although this was not officially confirmed.

After 1989, Liu Huaqing continued to play a significant role in the top leadership as the only military person in the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee through the 1990s.

Thursday, January 13, 2011

HKJ: The Strange Case of Zhou Yongjun

Thomas E. Kellogg at the Hong Kong Journal investigated the recent case of Zhou Yongjun, one of the prominent student leaders of the 1989 movement, that led to him being jailed in China for charges of bank fraud:

THE STRANGE CASE OF ZHOU YONGJUN
By Thomas E. Kellogg
January 2011

On the morning of September 28, 2008, a middle-aged ethnic Chinese man of seemingly unknown national origin and identity arrived in Hong Kong. Traveling on a false Malaysian passport under the name Wang Xingxiang, this man, when confronted, refused to state his real name. The other items in his possession – including bank cards and credit cards – also bore the name Wang Xingxiang; there was nothing else on his person that could establish his true identity.

This man was questioned by Immigration authorities, who were unable to wrestle his name or virtually any other information from him. He was also interviewed by the Hong Kong police, who apparently suspected him of involvement in attempted bank fraud. On the evening of October 1, this man was transferred from Hong Kong to Shenzhen. He was then held incommunicado in Shenzhen for seven months, after which time he was transferred to Suining City in Sichuan Province. It was only in May 2009 that it became publicly known that this man, whose real name is Zhou Yongjun, was in fact in Chinese custody. In November 2009, Zhou was tried by a court in Sichuan province for bank fraud, and sentenced to nine years in jail in January 2010. He remains in jail in Sichuan to this day.

The case of Zhou Yongjun is a strange one. Zhou, a student activist in Tiananmen Square, spent roughly 18 months in detention for his involvement in the 1989 student protests. After his release, Zhou fled China, and sought and received political asylum in the United States. Around 2002, he became involved with the exile spiritual leader Zhang Hongbao, the founder of the Qigong group Zhong Gong—not related to the better-known Falung Gong. Many have speculated that Zhou’s ties to both overseas democracy activists and exile Qigong groups heightened the Chinese government’s interest in him, and that these ties are very much related to his transfer from Hong Kong to China.

The murkiness of his case, and, more recently, revelations which have heightened suspicions that he was in fact involved in bank fraud, have obscured the very real concerns over Hong Kong’s autonomy and the integrity of “one country, two systems” that are raised by his treatment in Hong Kong. During his roughly four days in Hong Kong, Hong Kong authorities took decisions on his case that, while apparently not illegal, are nonetheless inconsistent with established practice. Since Zhou’s detention in Guangdong has become known, the Hong Kong SAR government has repeatedly refused to provide information on its handling of the case, instead resorting to bland restatements of government immigration policy and blanket refusals to comment on individual cases.

The Zhou Yongjun case is the first of its kind. As far as is known, since the 1997 handover, the Hong Kong government has never been involved in handing over to Chinese authorities an exile activist who could reasonably fear persecution based on prior political activism. The government’s handling of the case needs to be seen in the context of recent cases of seemingly political decisions by Hong Kong Immigration, to keep various persons, many of them exile dissidents and political activists, from entering Hong Kong. 1Troublingly, the Zhou Yongjun case seems to have taken that process one step further.

Since the initial public disclosure of Zhou’s detention in Sichuan, significant circumstantial evidence has emerged that suggest that Zhou may well have attempted to enter Hong Kong in order to engage in bank fraud. Yet the possibility that Zhou may well have had nefarious ends in mind does not exonerate the SAR government, if indeed political considerations or inappropriate contacts with mainland authorities played a role in its deviations from standard practice in Zhou’s case. The protections offered by the rule of law and Hong Kong’s autonomy under the one country, two systems formula exist not just for the innocent but also for the guilty.

Who is Zhou Yongjun?

A native of Pengxi County in Sichuan Province, Zhou Yongjun, now 43, was a student majoring in political science at China University of Political Science and Law when the student protests broke out in the Spring of 1989. Zhou was a sometime leader of the student protests. His claim to fame was that he was one of three students to kneel on the steps of the Great Hall of the People in an attempt to present a petition of student demands to senior Party leaders on the day of Hu Yaobang’s funeral, April 22, 1989. The protests were forcibly quashed by the government in the early morning hours of June 4, 1989. Zhou was detained in mid-June, and held for over a year without trial. He was released in January 1991. 2 Zhou fled China in June 1992, and arrived in the United States in February 1993.

Zhou’s first incarnation in the United States was as exile political activist, a not-uncommon role for Chinese who ended up in the United States or Europe after the Tiananmen Square protests. For the next few years, Zhou remained active in exile politics, based mostly in New York.

In December 1998, Zhou attempted to sneak back into the mainland and was detained in Guangzhou. After being held in Guangzhou for six months, Zhou was transferred to Sichuan, where he was sentenced to three years of reeducation through labor, a form of administrative detention most often used in China to deal with petty crimes. He was released in 2002, and allowed to return to the United States soon after his release.

It was after his return to the United States that Zhou’s story begins to intersect with that of Zhang Hongbao. And it may be that connection, even more than his 1989 student activism, that led Zhou to Hong Kong in 2008, and also led the Chinese government to take a stronger interest in him.

Zhang Hongbao was one of the first charismatic Qigong masters to emerge at the onset of China’s Qigong boom in the mid-1980s. He created his own form of Qigong, which he called Zhong Gong – a Chinese abbreviation of the full name, which means Chinese Qigong to Nourish Life and Increase Intelligence – and lectured on its precepts to ever-larger audiences in Beijing throughout the second half of the 1980s. 3By 1990, Zhang had achieved a certain level of fame: a 1990 biography, emphasizing his spiritual powers and teachings, sold more than ten million copies.

Zhang was determined to turn his public profile and army of devoted followers into a revenue machine. In the words of David Ownby, a leading Western expert on Qigong in China, Zhang was “the Donald Trump of the Qigong world.” 4 In the early 1990s, Zhang set up a nationwide network of Zhong Gong centers, which engaged in both Qigong training and practice, and the selling of related products, including writings and recordings on Qigong, medicine, and tea. His followers numbered in the millions, and the nationwide pyramidal scheme he set up ensured a large and steady stream of revenue into his coffers. Zhang was also careful to cultivate good relationships with Communist Party officials, and, at that time at least, expressed no interest in any sort of political agenda.

“It was a real moneymaking thing,” said Ownby, who teaches at the University of Montreal. “He applied a marketing logic pretty much from the beginning.” 5

Zhang’s Zhong Gong was by no means the only game in town: hundreds of other Qigong masters, many of them heading their own organizations, vied for followers alongside Zhong Gong. The most famous of these was Falun Gong, headed by the controversial spiritual leader Li Hongzhi. Whereas Zhong Gong was highly centralized and profit-driven, Falun Gong, especially in its early years, was highly decentralized. It focused less on money – there were no formal admission fees, and anyone could join – and more on the spiritual side of Qigong. 6 Its membership skyrocketed after its founding in 1992, and its tens of millions of adherents included not just average Chinese but also close relatives of senior central government officials.

The Party Grows Wary

Such rapid growth could not but catch the eye of wary Communist Party officials, and many within the Party urged vigilance against what they saw as an emerging threat. “Over time, there were detractors,” said Ownby. “There were people who thought this was getting out of hand.”

Friction between the Party and Qigong groups increased throughout the 1990s. Li Hongzhi left China in 1995, after hearing rumblings of discontent in official circles over his activities. Media attacks on Falun Gong in particular became a regular occurrence after that. In June 1996, for example, the Guangming Daily published a piece calling Li a “swindler” and referring to the groups practices as “feudal superstition.” 7Dozens of similar pieces followed in newspapers across the country.

Falun Gong adherents did not take these public attacks lying down, and tensions between the two sides continued to escalate. The famous protest staged by thousands of Falun Gong followers in front of Zhongnanhai, the seat of China’s government, in April 1999, was only the largest of a series of demonstrations. As it turned out, it was also the straw the broke the camel’s back: any lingering sympathy that Falun Gong may have had within the government evaporated, and the government moved to suppress the group.

The ensuing crackdown by the government swept up not only Falun Gong but also other Qigong groups, including Zhong Gong. Travelling under an assumed name, Zhang fled China in 1994, turning up in Guam in July 2000. He claimed political asylum, and came to the United States soon thereafter. 8 He seems to have brought at least some of the fortune he amassed in China during the 1990s with him.

It is not known exactly when Zhang Hongbao and Zhou Yongjun connected for the first time in exile, or why Zhou, an exile political activist, wanted to get in touch with a quasi-spiritual figure like Zhang. In court documents filed after Zhang’s death, Zhou indicated that he moved to California to work with Zhang in January 2003, identifying himself as a “special adviser and assistant.” 9

Whatever the timing of the initial contact and the reasons behind it, Zhou’s integration into Zhang’s exile Zhong Gong world seems to have been quite extensive. Zhou described Zhang as “my master, mentor and fatherly friend,” and recalled their hours-long daily conversations. 10 “We were very close,” Zhou wrote. Life in Zhang Hongbao’s exile world was not for the faint of heart: Zhang fought bitterly with his estranged former second-in-command Yan Qingyan, and he continued to be dogged by allegations of violent illegal behavior. In 2003, Zhang was charged with assaulting his housekeeper, He Nanfang; he later pleaded no contest to a lesser charge. 11Yet despite all of the turbulence, Zhou stayed by Zhang’s side. When Zhang was killed in a car accident in Arizona in July 2006, it was Zhou who spoke at a hastily-arranged press conference, seeming to imply foul play in Zhang’s death.

Zhou was also a party to the dispute over the rather large estate that Zhang left behind. At the time of his death, Zhang’s holdings included real estate and cash, some of it in bank accounts in several different countries. 12 Zhou’s decision to travel to Hong Kong took place against a backdrop of the increasingly acrimonious and high-stakes fight over all that Zhang had left behind.

It is the legal documents stemming from the fight over Zhang’s estate – as well as the paper trail from prior litigation involving Zhang, Zhou, Yan and others in the exile Zhong Gong circle – which most strongly indicate that Zhou could not have been ignorant of the significance of the name Wang Xingxiang.

Wang Xingxiang is the alias that Zhang Hongbao used when he left China in the mid-1990s. He continued to use that name on various bank accounts that held funds that he had amassed while still in China. Wang Xingxiang is openly identified as Zhang’s alias in several court documents, including on some documents in litigation to which Zhou was a party. And that same name appears on the Hong Kong bank accounts that, many believe, Zhou traveled to Hong Kong to access.

Zhou Yongjun’s Hong Kong Sojourn

On September 26, 2008, Zhou left his home in California for Asia. He told his girlfriend, Zhang Yuewei, with whom he had a six-month-old daughter, very little about his plans; after his arrest and detention in China became known, Zhang Yuewei publicly claimed that Zhang was in Hong Kong en route to Sichuan to visit his parents. 13

On September 28, Zhou arrived in Hong Kong from Macau. His false passport, bearing the name Wang Xingxiang, was uncovered, and he was taken into custody by Hong Kong Immigration officials. During his time in custody, Zhou was questioned by the Hong Kong police over a case of alleged bank fraud involving bank accounts in Hong Kong under the name Wang Xingxiang. The questioning by Hong Kong police took place both in an immigration office at the Hong Kong Macau Ferry Terminal and at a Hong Kong Police Department office.

The bank fraud inquiry related to attempts to extract funds from various bank accounts, both in Hong Kong and elsewhere, in the name of Wang Xingxiang, which, as noted above, was an alias of Zhang Hongbao. In May 2008, roughly four months before Zhou Yongjun’s arrival in Hong Kong, an individual claiming to be Wang Xingxiang sent fax transmissions bearing an address in Canada to a Citibank branch in Hong Kong, requesting transfer of two million Hong Kong dollars (roughly $250,000 by current exchange rates) to an account in British Columbia, Canada. 14Zhou’s entry into Hong Kong on a passport bearing the same name at least facially connected him to the case. 15

According to Zhou’s account of his time in custody, one of the Hong Kong police officers who had interrogated him informed him by phone in the evening of October 1 that he would not be prosecuted and that he would be released. Zhou, who had been transferred to a hospital for medical treatment, was asked to return to the Hong Kong Macau Ferry Terminal police station immediately. “Our investigation is over and we will not file any charges against you,” Zhou says the officer told him. “We let you go right away. Can you stop waiting there for the medicine and come back as soon as possible?” 16

At a few minutes after 8pm on October 1, again according to Zhou’s account, Zhou was put in a minibus with seven or eight men who, he was told, were Hong Kong Immigration officials. He apparently thought he would be driven from the Ferry Terminal police station to the ferry itself, but it soon became clear that they were headed to another destination entirely. Zhou claims that he was driven for roughly thirty minutes up through the New Territories into Shenzhen, after which time the car stopped and he was handed over to a group of mainland officials. Zhou’s time in Hong Kong had come to an end

At the very least, Zhou’s treatment by Chinese authorities after his return highlights the potential dangers of returning persons with sensitive political backgrounds to the mainland. Once Zhou was handed over to Chinese authorities, his rights were repeatedly violated. Although he openly disclosed his actual identity to his Shenzhen jailers very early in his confinement there, he was nonetheless given no access to an attorney or to members of his family. 17 In violation of Chinese law, he was held in incommunicado detention in Shenzhen under the name Wang Hua for seven months. Zhou’s US-based lawyer, Li Jinjin, has alleged that Zhou was tortured by Chinese authorities while in custody in Shenzhen.

It was only after he was transferred to a detention center in Suining City in Sichuan in May 2009 that the authorities formally acknowledged custody of Zhou, initiated the criminal process and allowed him some access to an attorney and family members. Both the investigation of Zhou’s case and his subsequent trial were marred by procedural violations all too common to “political” cases in China.

Analysis: Questionable Moves on Both Sides
There are many aspects of Zhou’s case which raise serious questions. First and foremost, if it was clear that Zhou had traveled into Hong Kong on a false passport, why did Hong Kong authorities choose not to prosecute him for passport fraud? According to several Hong Kong immigration lawyers, it is standard practice for the Hong Kong SAR government to prosecute individuals who show up in Hong Kong using false documents, in order to discourage others from doing so.

“This man’s case is unusual,” said Philip Dykes, a leading Hong Kong lawyer and human rights advocate. In a case like this, Dykes suggested, “you would have expected a prosecution.” 18

“They always prosecute,” another lawyer with extensive experience in immigration cases said, noting that the minimum sentence in such cases is usually eighteen months.

Yet, in Zhou’s case, the Hong Kong authorities declined to prosecute. As senior Hong Kong officials have pointed out after Zhou’s case came to light, the power to prosecute for passport fraud is in fact discretionary, 19 and it must be said that no violation of Hong Kong law has emerged in the SAR’s handling of Zhou’s case. But why did the SAR government depart from standard operating procedure in its handling of Zhou’s case? Would not the evidence linking Zhou to bank fraud – discussed in more detail below – strengthen, rather than weaken, the argument in favor of prosecution?

Many observers, Zhou’s lawyers among them, have questioned why Hong Kong Immigration chose to return Zhou to the mainland, rather than Macau, where he had come from, or the United States, his place of residence. Others, including Legislative Councillors Margaret Ng and Leung Kwok-hung, also known as Long Hair, have asked whether Immigration officials informed Zhou that he would be returned to the mainland, and obtained his consent to return. 20 As of this writing, the SAR government has not made clear whether Zhou was told that he was being returned to the mainland; it has generally declined to comment on the specifics of Zhou’s case.

It should be noted that there are one or two key discrepancies between Zhou’s own account of his time in Hong Kong and the story told by the relevant Hong Kong Immigration documents. Most crucially, Zhou suggests that he never revealed his name or the fact that he is originally from mainland China. The Immigration Department’s Record of Interview for Zhou, which begins at 11.12pm on September 30, and ends at 1am on the morning of October 1, does not suggest that Zhou revealed his identity, but it does state that he initially informed immigration officials of his actual place of birth, Sichuan province. Other immigration forms generated by Hong Kong Immigration also state that Zhou identified his place of birth as Sichuan, and that this was the basis for Zhou’s removal to the Mainland. 21

If true, this would suggest a more solid factual basis for the Hong Kong government’s decision to return Zhou to the mainland than has previously emerged. As many have pointed out, standard practice would be to return an individual either to his place of residence or his place of origin. If Zhou’s current place of residence was genuinely unknown, then it would make sense to return him to the mainland.

Yet while certain moves by the Hong Kong authorities deserve further scrutiny, Zhou himself also made choices that are difficult to understand. For example, Zhou’s decision not to reveal his actual identity remains a curious one. If, as his own account of his return to the mainland suggests, he began to suspect that he was being transported back to China, why did he not disclose his actual identity, and request deportation to the United States, his place of residence? Surely doing so would have made it much more difficult for Hong Kong immigration officials to send him back to China. It is at least possible that Zhou thought he could ride the entire episode out by keeping his mouth shut; he may have believed that, once the Hong Kong authorities tired of him, he would be put on a plane back to California. Yet doubt must have crept into his mind as he was being driven northward. Zhou’s silence as he was being driven to Shenzhen remains one of the key unanswered questions of the affair, one that begs elaboration by Zhou himself.

The Hong Kong Immigration file on Zhou’s case also casts further doubt on Zhou’s claim that he was unaware of Zhang’s use of the alias Wang Xingxiang, and also provides some circumstantial evidence connecting Zhou to the case of bank fraud for which he was tried and convicted. According to Hong Kong Immigration documents, Zhou was carrying a various credit and bank cards in the name of Wang Xingxiang; it is unlikely that someone who picked up a false passport with, as Zhou claims, a randomly-assigned name, would also go through the trouble of having bank cards created in that same name. Zhou was also carrying a business card of Zhang Hongbao’s, which, one assumes, Zhou would not have wanted to carry into the mainland with him for security reasons. Also, the date of birth listed on Zhou’s fake Malaysian passport, August 8, 1953, corresponds with the date of birth on Zhang Hongbao’s fake mainland Chinese ID card in the name of Wang Xingxiang. 22

These additional facts, when combined with revelations first uncovered by the South China Morning Post about Zhou’s extensive connections with Zhang, further undermine the credibility of Zhou’s claim that he did not know that Zhang Hongbao used Wang Xingxiang as an alias, and that he was given the fake Malaysian passport in that name at random. In sum, it is difficult to believe that it could have been a (for Zhou) unlucky coincidence. One is left to wonder: if it is in fact the case that Zhou obtained a forged passport in the name of Wang Xingxiang, why did he do so?

And yet, as more and more circumstantial evidence mounts of Zhou’s involvement in attempted bank fraud comes to light, the Hong Kong authorities’ decision to return him to the mainland becomes even more difficult to understand. If, as seems to be the case, the Hong Kong police had in their possession evidence that strongly suggested Zhou’s intent to engage in illegal activity in Hong Kong, why did they not prosecute him? At the very least, why not begin prosecution for his use of a false passport, a seeming open-and-shut case, and continue to investigate Zhou’s possible involvement in bank fraud?

What Next?

Even if one views the facts of Zhou’s case as suggestive of foul play on the part of Zhou, its outcome is nonetheless troubling. Zhou was held for months in incommunicado detention, and was denied a fair trial. His ability to speak on his own behalf, and to shed light on some of the more perplexing aspects of his case, is limited. Perhaps most importantly, his girlfriend and young daughter have no access to him in China.

What, if anything, can be done? Options are severely limited. When appropriate, the US will arrange for US citizens convicted of crimes in foreign countries to serve their sentence in the United States. Such transfers can only take place with the consent of the prisoner him or herself, and do not include the right to a new trial in America. In fact, reconsideration of the original verdict, no matter how flawed, is generally off the table.

Such an option would be an attractive one for Zhou: it would get him out of China, and would allow him to serve his sentence in a place where his girlfriend and daughter could have at least some contact with him. Yet for Zhou, prisoner transfer is not possible: he is only a green card holder, not a US citizen, and is therefore not eligible for prisoner transfer. Also, although Hong Kong does have a prisoner transfer agreement with the US, China does not. 23

In sum, Zhou’s legal options are virtually non-existent. The only option left may be political: the only way that progress might be made on Zhou’s case is if international human rights groups and foreign governments intervene on his behalf, making the case with Beijing for an early release. Yet this option too is problematic: especially since the link between Zhou and alleged bank fraud has become more pronounced, the voices calling for action on his case, never particularly strong, have grown even quieter.

It is likely that the lack of action around his case has everything to do with the lack of clarity surrounding the allegations of impropriety by Zhou. To this day, Zhou Yongjun has maintained his innocence, claiming, however improbably, that he ended up with a passport in the (false) name of his former patron completely by accident and without his knowledge. As Zhou endures his third year behind bars in China, one wonders whether he might want to consider a different approach: if he decides to fully and publicly explain his reasons for traveling to Hong Kong, might not his act of painful honesty generate a bit more sympathy for him, such that international actors in a position to weigh in on his case with Beijing might be more inclined to do so? A slim reed, to be sure, but at this point where else can Zhou pin his hopes?

Thomas E. Kellogg is program director and advisor to the president of the Open Society Institute. He is also adjunct professor of law at the Fordham Law School.

1. For more on seemingly political decisions by Hong Kong Immigration related to entry into Hong Kong, see Thomas E. Kellogg, “Stirring Up Trouble: the Johannes Chan Incident, Ideological Exclusion and Immigration Law in Hong Kong and Macau,” Hong Kong Journal, July 2009.

2. Lena H. Sun, “Chinese Activists Sentenced; Student Leader Wang Given 4-Year Term,” Washington Post, January 27, 1991.

3. David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 71. For a very good short summary of Zhang’s rise and fall in China, see Ownby, pp. 70-77. See also David Palmer, Qigong Fever: Body, Science, and Utopia in China, Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 146-150.

4. Author interview with David Ownby, June 9, 2010.

5.Author interview.

6. Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: the End of Days, Yale University Press, 2004, p. 4.

7.Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China, p. 168.

8. Zhang’s attempt to come to the US and claim political asylum was complicated by rape charges that had been filed against him in China; Zhang and his followers claimed that the charges were politically-motivated. See Joseph Kahn, “US Delays Asylum Hearing for Leader of a Chinese Sect,” New York Times, August 19, 2000; Erik Eckholm, “Beijing Lists Charges Against Sect Leader Who Fled to Guam,” New York Times, September 15, 2000.

9.Kristin Jones, “The Twisted Tale of a Flawed Dissident,” South China Morning Post, March 20, 2010.

10. Ibid.

11. David Pierson, “Stakes High for Accused Dissident,” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 2003.

12. According to one estimate, Zhang’s estate, which includes homes in both California and Texas, is worth roughly $2million. It is unclear if this estimate includes various bank accounts under the name Wang Xingxiang. Molly Hennessy-Fiske, “Selling What the Dead Left Behind,” Los Angeles Times, December 28, 2009.

13. “He insisted on going because he wanted to visit his family,” Zhang Yuewei told a reporter. “His father has had a stroke and is partially paralyzed, and his mother has heart disease. We had a quarrel over it.” Fox Yi Hu, “How HK Handed Over a Dissident,” South China Morning Post, October 18, 2009.

14.Copies of those fax transmissions on file with author.

15. Those fax transmissions, copies of which Zhou claims were given to him during his interrogation by Hong Kong police, later were presented as evidence at Zhou’s trial in Sichuan. In his interview with prominent rights lawyer Mo Shaoping, which took place at Zhou’s prison in Sichuan on May 25, 2009, Zhou denied any prior knowledge of those transmissions. A transcript of that conversation is available online at: http://www.zonaeuropa.com/20091013_1.htm.

16. Zhou Yongjun letter to his attorneys, March 3, 2010. Available online at: http://www.inmediahk.net/node/1008351.

17. Li Jinjin, “Zhou Yongjun’s Case Report,” September 19, 2009. Available online at:

18.Author interview, Hong Kong, May 2010.

19. Legislative Council, Panel on Security, Minutes of meeting, November 3, 2009, pp. 12-13.

20. Legislative Council, Panel on Security, Minutes of meeting, November 3, 2009, pp. 11-12.

21. See, for example, the Confirmation of Departure form, dated October 3, 2008.

22. See Beijing Public Security Bureau statement, “Zhang Hongbao is a criminal suspect in China,” July 25, 2000; available online at: http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/sgxx/sggg/sgxw/t34848.htm.

23. Agreement Between the Government of Hong Kong and the Government of the United States of America for the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, April 17, 1999.

Tuesday, January 11, 2011

Confucius Standing at Tiananmen Square

There is a new giant statue at Tiananmen Square. It is not that of late Chairman Mao Zedong, although it is similar in size of the numerous Mao statues all over China during the Culture Revolution era.

It is that of Confucius, the ancient philosopher that Mao Zedong had spent his last few years loathing.


The new statue stands in front of the National Museum of China on the east edge of Tiananmen Square. It is part of a grand renovation project for the museum. It is also a rare new addition to the famous Square.

No words on how Mao Zedong, whose body is still being preserved in his own Mausoleum in the middle of the same Square, reacts to his new neighbor.

Friday, January 7, 2011

More Details on "Operation Yellow Bird"

A day after the Ming Daily published Szeto Wah's interview on "Operation Yellow Bird" after his death, the magazine Asia Weekly followed suite and published its own story on the same subject. The new story was based on Chen Dazheng (陈达鉦), the self-claimed Commander-in-Chief on the front line of the operation.

Chen Dazheng is a Hong Kong businessman and has been active in the trade business between Hong Kong and mainland China, sometimes involved in its underground activities. He was commonly referred to as "Brother Six" for he being the sixth child in his family. In the past two or three years, Chen Dazheng has already revealed part of the story behind the operation, but none of which had the same level of detail.

In the Asia Weekly story, Chen Dazheng expressed his admiration of Szeto Wah, referring him as one of the two leaders/bosses for him in the entire operation. He said that he is motivated to tell the story now so that people could know what kind of person Szeto Wah was.

Chen Dazheng said that most of the names and information he had for the daring rescue mission came from Uncle Wah. He usually receives half of a photo or currency note, with the other half kept by the person he needed to help. A successful contact was made when the photo or note could be matched up. In most cases, he did not know the identity of the person he was rescuing until after they reached the safety of Hong Kong. While Chen Dazheng was operating on the "front line", Uncle Wah stayed behind monitoring each rescue mission closely, providing all necessary fund and the logistic work of taking care of the people after they came ashore at Hong Kong.

The name "Yellow Bird" was derived from an ancient poem describing how a yellow bird was trapped in a net but was freed by a boy with a sword. Chen Dazheng also described in detail of one particular risky mission, in which they failed to get two student leaders out of China for a couple of weeks. They had to dump them in the open ocean once to evade the Chinese coast guard surrounding them. But they were able to rescue them again and eventually got them to Hong Kong by a speedy boat.

Chen Dazheng is already 67 years old. He promised to tell more of the stories of "Operation Yellow Bird" before he dies.